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Abstract
COVID-19 is a novel coronavirus caused by the severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). It can result in severe respiratory damage.
Different countries have recommended different combinations of protections during
the COVID-19 pandemic. Various combinations of mitigation strategies or “layered
protections” against coronavirus have also been communicated differently across
nations. This mixed-methods content analysis seeks to compare COVID-19 mitigation
information on three national health agency websites for Taiwan, Kenya, and the
United States. Availability and navigability of information was examined for each
mitigation strategy. The Web Resource Rating tool was used to assess the quality of
the information about health protections provided on each website. Findings included
available information on all health protections in all three countries. However,
navigation to and quality of information on some mitigation strategies varied across
countries.
Keywords: COVID-19 communication, COVID-19 mitigation, health
communication
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Comparing Governmental Communication about COVID-19 Layered
Protection Strategies in Taiwan, Kenya, and the United States:
A Mixed-Method Analysis of National Health Agency Websites
COVID-19 is a novel coronavirus caused by the severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). It can result in severe respiratory damage.
SARS-CoV-2 was first reported in China at the end of 2019 and rapidly spread to the
rest of the world over the subsequent months (Miller 2021). It is highly contagious
and more fatal than other viruses, including viruses that cause influenza (Li 2021). In
spite of its ability to kill more people, SARS-CoV-2 has had a lower death rate than
the other notable epidemics (Li 2021), a result that may relate in part to how
governments have communicated about multiple mitigation strategies, or “layered
protections” against infection. These mitigation strategies include traditional hygienerelated infectious disease prevention strategies, as well as environmental mitigation
strategies to slow airborne transmission of COVID-19. Different countries may have
emphasized various combinations of protections in their official communications. An
important platform for delivery of government information about COVID-19
mitigation is the world wide web. This analysis will evaluate how three different
countries’ government health agency websites have communicated about specific
kinds of COVID-19 protections.
When news about COVID-19 initially broke, governments, scientists, public
health officials, and healthcare workers across the world recommended different
policies for mitigation and containment of the virus, and they deployed varying
communication strategies to promote these policies (Chang 2020). For example,
Mousazadeh (2021) described the Swiss Cheese Model of COVID-19 Defence
(Figure 1), which relayed the idea that every individual form of protection is
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imperfect, so multiple layers are needed to slow the spread of COVID-19. Protections
recommended in the Swiss Cheese Model include vaccinations, COVID-19 testing,
quarantine & isolation, social distancing, hand hygiene, masking, addressing
ventilation and air filtration concerns, and enacting stay at home orders.
Different countries have recommended different combinations of protections
at different times. Early in the Pandemic, for example, Taiwan developed the
Taiwanese Communicable Disease Control Act, which allowed mandatory initiatives
for lockdown at borders, contact tracing, and quarantine (Su 2021). Considering the
severe economic consequences of countrywide lockdowns, other countries
emphasized individual decision-making to implement recommended mitigations for
containing the spread of COVID-19. The United States, for example, emphasized
more voluntary health protective behaviours like handwashing, social distancing,
quarantining, and mask wearing (Stroebe et al 2021). Kenya and other countries in
sub-Saharan Africa responded to COVID-19 by trying to strike a balance to minimize
morbidity and adverse economic impact through strategies that included adopting
nationwide dusk-to-dawn curfews, decreasing social gatherings, and implementing
mandatory handwashing before entry of any public premises or public transportation
(Wangari et al 2021). These examples reflect the Swiss Cheese Model, with the
different types of mitigation strategies, or “layered protections” being promoted to
decrease the spread of COVID-19.
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Figure 1
The Swiss Cheese Model of COVID19 Defence

Note. The Swiss Cheese Model of COVID19 Defence Identifies Personal and Shared
Mitigation Strategies that Can Be Layered to Better Protect Against COVID-19
Infection (Mousazadeh et al., 2021).
Varied National Experiences During COVID-19 Pandemic
Varied national responses to the COVID-19 pandemic may have contributed to
differences in controlling the spread of the virus (Mallah 2021). In China’s Hubei
province, the city of Wuhan - where SARS-CoV-2 had first emerged on December 1,
2019 - underwent a lockdown at its border on January 23, 2020 (Mallah 2021). Other
Chinese provinces followed suit on February 11, 2020. According to Mallah (2021),
“The lockdown on Wuhan was theorized to have delayed the spread to other areas in
China by 2.91 days, decreased the number of cases by 33.3%, and reduced worldwide
spread by 77%.”
Other Asian countries responded quickly, using strategies that were refined
after the 2003 SARS and 2009 H1N1 Influenza outbreaks. Taiwan had increased its
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laboratory capacity to respond to COVID-19 by building a national program to
include 27 laboratories in the country (Mallah 2021). To date, Taiwan has seen lower
confirmed case counts and mortality rates than many nations. As of February 28,
2022, Taiwan’s case counts were 2.59 confirmed cases per 100,000 persons, with a
mortality rate of less than 0.01 per 100,000 persons (CDC 2022).
In comparison, sub-Saharan Africa began its emergency response on January
27, 2020, with mitigation and containment measures geared toward reducing case
growth. While receiving funding and medical supplies from various nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), the African Union (AU) announced a COVID-19 fund to
support accelerated COVID-19 testing (Mallah 2021). During the pandemic, the
continent has seen proportionally lower cases and deaths than many parts of the
world, with “Africa making up only 3% of the COVID-19 cases worldwide, and 3%
of the deaths as of February 23, 2020, despite forming around 17% of the world
population” (Mallah 2021). Among the countries comprising those continental
outcomes is Kenya, which, as of February 28, 2022, has seen case counts of 0.3
confirmed cases per 100,000 persons, with a mortality rate of less than 0.01 per
100,000 persons (CDC 2022).
In contrast to other countries, the United States (U.S.) has experienced higher
numbers of COVID-19 cases and deaths (Mallah 2021). As of February 2022, U.S.
case counts were 100.4 per 100,000, with a mortality rate of 3.1 per 100,000 persons
(CDC 2022). Total cumulative U.S. cases and deaths have been reported as
78,539,082 and 951,254, respectively (CDC 2022). While encountering its first case
of COVID-19 on February 26, 2020, the U.S. faced delays rolling out widespread
COVID-19 testing (Mallah 2021).
Minimizing Transmission by Layering Health Protections
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According to the U.S. CDC (2021), the modes of SARS-CoV-2 transmission
are inhalation, exposure to contaminated mucous membranes, and mucous membrane
touched with hands that have had contact with the virus. An example of direct contact
is shaking hands contaminated with the virus (Miller 2020). Indirect contact arises
from touching contaminated objects, or fomites, followed by touching exposed mucus
membranes such as the mouth, nostrils, or eyes (Miller 2020).
The U.S. CDC (2021) further explains, “the principal mode by which people
are infected with SARS-CoV-2 is through exposure to respiratory droplets carrying
the infectious virus.” Individuals can release respiratory fluids in the air in the form of
droplets through actions of quiet breathing, speaking, singing, exercising, coughing,
and sneezing. The droplets carrying the virus are expelled into the air. The largest
droplets (larger than 100 µm) can settle out of the air rapidly and fall to the ground or
other surfaces. Large droplets also can travel directly from an infected person’s nose
or mouth to another person’s eyes, nostrils, or mouth (Miller 2020). The smallest
droplets (smaller than 100 µm) can remain in the air for minutes to hours (CDC
2021). The U.S. CDC also mentions that enclosed spaces with inadequate ventilation
can lead to high concentrations of exhaled infectious aerosol particles for longer
periods of time, increasing potential for inhalation, especially at distances less than 6
feet from an infectious source (CDC 2021). More recent studies have indicated that
the production of aerosols < 5 µm can make people susceptible to inhalation at
distances outside the recognized range of 6 feet (Dancer 2021). This more recent
definition of infectious aerosols has been adopted by infection prevention bodies such
as the World Health Organization (Dancer 2021). Currently, the infectious dose of
SARS -CoV-2 is not known, and relative contributions of inhalation of the virus as
opposed to deposition of virus on mucous membranes remains difficult to establish
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(CDC 2021). The gaps in knowledge for the transmission of COVID-19 are
stimulating further research, as well as challenges for communicating about potential
health protections.
According to Prather (2021), discussions are needed about modes of virus
transmission to ensure effective control strategies against COVID-19 and to provide
guidance to the public, as physical distancing at least 6 feet apart may be inadequate
for reducing aerosol transmission (Prather et al 2020). Although policies for both
mask-wearing and hygiene have been adopted across the world to limit the
transmission of the virus via droplets, Prather and colleagues (2020) argue that
individuals are far more likely to inhale thousands of virus-laden aerosols than to be
sprayed by or have contact with a droplet.
This type of transmission was demonstrated in Skagit Valley, Washington,
U.S. On March 10th, 2020, a superspreading event occurred during a weekly choir
rehearsal for the Skagit Valley Chorale. Fifty-three (53) of the 61 members of the
Chorale confirmed or were strongly suspected to have contracted COVID-19 (Miller
2020). The route of transmission was believed to be through aerosol exposures since
strict social distancing precautions were taken during rehearsal, including forward
distances between rows of chairs of at least 4.5 feet (Miller 2020). Attendees of the
rehearsal reported no physical contact with each other, and there was no direct
evidence of transmission by droplet. As stated by Miller (2020), “The large number of
infections arising from this event, compared to the low incidence in the country at the
time, made it unlikely that infections were acquired at a different setting other than
the choir.” It was hypothesized that transmission was likely generated by inhalation of
respiratory aerosol from one index case through singing and “shared air” (Miller
2020). Thus, Prather et al. (2020) argue that attention should be shifted to protections
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against airborne transmission, such as providing indoor ventilation and air filtration,
moving activities outdoors, and using high-quality masks.
More recently, Greenhalgh (2021) has asserted that at least 59% of all global
transmissions occurred from infectious aerosols from asymptomatic individuals,
marking it as a key way SARS-CoV-2 has spread around the world. The lack of viable
SARS-CoV-2 air samples due to limited effective sampling methods has led to
inconclusive evidence to support a dominant route of transmission, respiratory or
fomite (Greenhalgh 2021). Although air sampling has confirmed the presence of
SARS-CoV-2 in hospitals, sampling has not always detected viable virus, even
though surfaces and air vents provide reservoirs (Dancer 2020). It can be argued that
mechanical ventilation systems, such as in healthcare environments, offer reasonable
protection towards airborne virus, unlike community homes, restaurants, and public
transport systems that do not have sophisticated ventilation systems. Lack of adequate
ventilation and filtration, therefore, may lead to increases in exposures to SARS-CoV2 from aerosols in indoor environments (Dancer 2020).
Peng and Jimenez (2021) have argued that carbon dioxide, or CO2, can be
used as a proxy to measure concentrations of SARS-CoV-2 indoors. According to the
authors, “pathogen-containing aerosols and CO2 are co-exhaled by those infected”
with SARS-CoV-2 (Peng & Jimenez, 2021). Because measurements of viruscontaining aerosols are difficult to obtain, and ambient level of CO2 is almost stable,
CO2 levels may serve as an indication of infection risk from SARS-CoV-2 laden
aerosols expelled by humans (Peng 2021). However, CO2 levels corresponding to a
specific concentration for COVID-19 infection risk is still largely unknown (Peng
2021). Aerosol science thus has opened the door for additional policies aimed to
reducing infectious aerosols via measurements of air quality, providing guidance for
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ventilation systems and air filtration, and wearing high-quality masks that can help
reduce exposure risk.
CERC and Its importance in Public Health and Health Care Systems
Since one primary route of transmission of COVID-19 is still being debated,
communication about COVID-19 prevention has focused on a variety of potential
protections. The overall response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been an evolving
process leading to new and creative strategies for mitigation and communication. In
keeping with the precautionary principle (Kriebel et al, 2001), public health strategies
can be recommended while evidence of effectiveness is still emerging to help prevent
future harm to the public. When danger is perceived as imminent, cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental exposures can be taken, even when threats of
serious or irreversible damage lack full scientific certainty (Persson 2016).
While the primary driver of COVID-19 spread is debated scientifically,
providing information for mitigating against all exposure routes is important. The
timeliness of responses and adoption of specific preventive measures may be
important to subsequent rates of COVID-19 infection (Yong 2022). Therefore,
effective risk and crisis communication is a critical component in an infectious
disease response. The U.S. CDC’s Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication
(CERC) initiative has been used to respond to a variety of public health emergencies
(Yong 2020). CERC asserts that six principles should be followed during emergency
response and recovery: 1. Be First (quickly sharing information about a disease
outbreak); 2. Be Right (providing accurate information); 3. Be Credible (ensuring
information is honest and evidence-based); 4. Express Empathy (acknowledging
people’s feelings); 5. Promote Action (informing the public about prevention
strategies); and 6. Show Respect (listening and acknowledging cultural beliefs, fears,
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or concerns) (CDC 2020). Public health communicators can use these principles to
provide mitigation information that could help decrease the spread of COVID-19.
A recent study in an acute-based hospital in Singapore showed CERC
principles to be a “valuable framework for understandable, actionable, accurate,
concise, and timely updates to the response in the COVID-19 pandemic” (Yoon
2021). Nurses, allied health professionals, and administrative staff reported favourable
areas of CERC principles such as being timely, being credible and providing accurate
information, regarding the use of secure text messaging in the form of real-time
updates that were seen as more useful than emails (Yoon 2021). At least 92% of
survey respondents were clear about the hospital’s response to COVID-19 while a
smaller percentage (80%) were also able to understand their challenges and address
their concerns. The study concluded that CERC principles can be an effective
communication framework to produce better responses to COVID-19 both in the
hospital setting and in public health communication strategies. Yoon (2021) asserts
this study is the first to demonstrate that CERC principles applied early and
appropriately may be as effective as vaccination and social distancing in preventing
rapid outbreak of a contagious disease in South Korea (Yoon 2021). The study
concludes that effective risk communication is critical to the global COVID-19
response (Yoon 2021).
While CERC provides a helpful framework for communicating COVID-19
mitigation strategies, different protection strategies may have been emphasized across
nations during the global response. An important platform that national governments
have used for delivering information about layering protections is through
government health websites. This analysis will evaluate how different countries’
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health websites have communicated about specific kinds of COVID-19 protections
recommended.
Research Questions
This comparative website content analysis will examine information about
various COVID-19 prevention and protection strategies in three countries: Kenya,
Taiwan, and the U.S.. These three countries have experienced different case counts
and mortality rates during the pandemic (CDC 2022). Comparing how protective
strategies were communicated by each country may provide insights into how
mitigation options are prioritized by each national health agency. Evidence obtained
through this mixed-methods study may help identify gaps in governmentally provided
information about specific mitigation strategies. This knowledge can inform future
government communication efforts about layering protections to help decrease the
transmission of COVID-19. Findings also may inform future research comparing the
effectiveness of national health agency communication during a public health
emergency. Findings also may contribute to best practices for promoting the adoption
of layered protections strategies for COVID-19.
Specifically, this study seeks to address the following research questions: RQ
1. How do country-specific government websites for Taiwan, the U.S., and Kenya
vary in availability of different types of information about different mitigation
strategies? RQ 2. How do the websites vary in their navigability and process for users
to obtain information about layered protection strategies against COVID-19? RQ 3.
How do the websites vary in the quality of information they provide about layered
protection strategies against COVID-19?
Methods
Study Design
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This study is a cross-sectional, mixed-methods content analysis comparing online
national health agency websites for Taiwan, Kenya, and the U.S. Health information
about specific mitigation strategies was compared across the Taiwan CDC, the
Ministry of Health for the Republic of Kenya, and U.S. CDC. Websites were
compared between January 30 and February 28, 2022.
Participants
Participants were national health agency websites in three countries that have
seen varying morbidity and mortality outcomes from the COVID-19 pandemic.
According to NBC News, Taiwan has experienced fewer confirmed cases and fewer
confirmed deaths (nbcnews.com). The U.S. has experienced the most confirmed
COVID-19 cases and deaths (nbcnews.com). Kenya’s experience lied between these
two (nbcnews.com). The experiences of these three countries also have been
compared elsewhere (Bremmer 2020).
The countries were selected based in part on their varying geographic
locations to ensure representation from different regions globally. Taiwan was
selected from Asia, Kenya from Africa, and the U.S. from the Americas. PubMed
Central and Google Scholar were searched for COVID-19 response, mitigation, and
communication literature in each country. Inclusion criteria for each country selected
included: a national health agency website had to exist; an English language version
of the website had to be available for review; and scholarly literature on national
outcomes had to be available.
Data Collection
I searched each national health agency website to retrieve the most current
information about specific COVID-19 mitigation strategies. Information was included
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from articles/abstracts, press releases, videos, standard website pages, and other types
of communication products.
Data Source and Measurement
In this content analysis, I examined three websites to compare the availability,
navigability, and quality of website information on specific mitigation strategies for
COVID-19. Below I describe how each construct was measured. Based on the Swiss
Cheese Model, layered protection was defined as a combination of individual and
community protections against SARS-CoV-2 intended to help decrease the spread of
COVID-19. Since every form of individual protection has imperfections, information
may be provided about multiple layers of protection to help slow the spread of
COVID-19 (Mousazadeh 2021) (Figure 1).
Each national health agency website was analysed for information about the
following COVID-19 mitigation strategies: 1. Ventilation; 2. Masking; 3. Travel and
border control; 4. Isolation and quarantine; 5. Social distancing; and 6. vaccination.
Availability
The COVID-19 home page for each government website was retrieved
through a basic google search. From this landing page, I searched for information
about each mitigation strategy listed above, first to determine whether information
was available. Appropriate links for mitigation strategies in the form of
articles/abstracts, press releases, PDFs, pamphlets, infographics, etc. were searched
and accessed through the main website page. The presence or absence of information
about each form of health protection was noted by a dichotomous response of “Yes”
or “No”. All responses were recorded.
Navigability
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To determine navigability, or the ease with which users can find information
about a given mitigation strategy, I counted the number of clicks required to access
information about that protection. The total number of clicks for each website and
mitigation strategy was aggregated in a table format.
Navigability was further assessed in relation to the types of informational
products a national health agency website provided for each mitigation strategy.
Specifically, I identified whether mitigation information was available in the form of
press releases, journal articles or abstracts, video messages, PDFs and flyers,
infographics, and/or standard web pages and visual aids. The total number of routes
offered to obtain information about each layered protection strategy was aggregated in
a table format.
Reliability and Quality
The Web Resource Rating tool (Dobbins et al., 2018), or WRR, was used to
analyse the quality of mitigation information on national health agency websites. The
tool provides metrics for assessing the following domains: Evidence Base,
Transparency, and 3. Usability. The WRR quantification scheme for each domain
follows.
1. Evidence Base:
The presence or absence of the following information was noted dichotomously
with Yes (Y) or No (N): single published data from peer-reviewed sources, statistics,
and textbooks; published randomized control trials at least in text or in a reference
list; reference to at least a systematic review meta-analysis in text or a reference list;
best practice guidelines in text or in a reference list; a site-wide policy which states
the quality of the evidence; and the strength of the recommendation provided by
either Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluations
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(GRADE) criteria, or the summary of a larger report using GRADE criteria to inform
recommendations.
2. Transparency
Transparency of national health agency websites was analysed by the presence or
absence of the following: peer-reviewed sources for each recommendation, such as intext citations from credible peer reviewed sources; affiliation of authority was clearly
labelled as taking responsibility of the website content; all advertising was clearly
labelled; and the web resource was updated within the last three 3 years.
3. Usability
Lastly, to analyse the usability of the website information, the website was
examined for: presence of a feedback mechanism such as a “contact us” link or a
comment section; logical flow of information; and accessibility of the web resource
information, such as text re-size options, screen reader for text content, and subtitles
or transcription for non-text content.
Scores from each WRR section were added together: The total score for the
Evidence Base section was provided in Step 1. The Transparency and Usability
sections were totalled together in Step 2. A total score of Step 1 and Step 2 was
calculated and noted in table format.
Results
Information was available for every mitigation strategy examined across
national health agency websites for Taiwan, the U.S., and Kenya. No variance was
found between countries in the basic availability of information about specific health
protections. Each country had at the very least, some information about every form of
protection included in the analysis.
Although information was available for all forms of health protections, the
websites did have some variations in their navigability. Taiwan CDC required the
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most clicks to access information about masking and isolation (Table 1a). The U.S.
required the fewest clicks to access information about all layered health protections,
with information readily available for each mitigation strategy after just one click.
Kenya displayed some variation in navigability, requiring more clicks to access
information about ventilation and travel (Table 1a).
Table 1a
Number of clicks required to access website information about each health protection

Isolation

Social
distancing

Vaccination

Taiwan CDC
5
15
United States
1
1
CDC
Kenya Ministry of Health
6
3
CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Travel/border
control

Masking

Ventilation

strategy (January 30- February 28, 2022)

1
1

10
1

5
1

1
1

6

1

2

1

The types of information products available for each health protection also
varied across national health agency websites. All websites provided at least two or
more types of information products for vaccination (Table 1b). The U.S. provided
more types of resources for masking than any other website, while also providing
more types of information products related to masking than any other mitigation
strategy (Table 1b). Taiwan had fewer communication products for ventilation than
other countries (Table 1b). At least one type of information product was provided for
each health protection on each national health agency website.
Table 1b
Types of communication products made available for each health protection (January
30-February 28, 2022)

Taiwan CDC
Press release
Journal articles/abstracts
video messaging
PDFs flyers
Infographics
general website/Visual aids
Totals
Kenya Ministry of Health
Press release
Journal articles/abstracts
video messaging
PDFs flyers & Resources
Infographics
general website/Visual aids
Totals

Vaccination

Social
Distancing

18

Isolation

Travel/Border
Control

Masking

Ventilation
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*

*

*
*

*

*

*

*

*

*
*

1

2

2

1

2

3

*
*

*

*

*

*
2

1

*
*
2

1

*
1

*
3

United States CDC

Press release
Journal articles/abstracts
video messaging
PDFs flyers/guidelines
Infographics
general website/Visual aids
Totals

*

*

*
*

*
*

*

*
2

*
4

*

*

*
*

*

*

3

3

1

2

The WRR tool was used to assess the quality of website information through
evidence base, transparency, and usability. The websites showed no variation in the
evidence or transparency across countries (Table 2). However, variations across
countries were seen for usability. The national health agency websites for Taiwan and
Kenya were more challenging to navigate for information about each layered
protection, resulting in their lower scores than the U.S. for usability (Table 2). Thus,
the U.S. scored slightly higher than Taiwan and Kenya in its combined score for
demonstrating transparency and usability (Table 2).
Table 2
Web Resource Rating tool-assessed usability of COVID 19 information provided by
each national health agency website
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Tool Assessment: Assessing the Quality of online health Information
COVID-19
Evidence Base & Quality

Taiwan

Kenya

U.S.

1. is the web resource informed by published single studies?

Y

Y

Y

2. Is the web resource informed by published randomized controlled trials (RCTs)?

Y

Y

Y

3. Is the web resource informed by published systematic reviews/meta-analysis?

Y

Y

Y

4. Is the web resource informed by best practice guidelines?

Y

Y

Y

5. is the quality of the evidence reported?

Y

Y

Y

6. Is the strength of the recommendations provided?

N

N

N

7. Are peer-reviewed sources provided for each form of layered protection?

Y

Y

Y

8. Are the authors' or editors' name affiliated with the website content?

Y

Y

Y

9. Is the layered protection clearly labeled?

Y

Y

Y

10. Has the web resource been created or updated within the last 3 years?

Y

Y

Y

11. In there a feedback mechanism or "contact me " link?

Y

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Step 1: Evidence-based criteria score:

5

5

5

Step 2: Transparency & Usability criteria

6

6

7

11

11

12

Transparency

Usability
12. Is there a logical flow of information offered to navigate each layered
protection?
13. Accessibility: Does the web resource offer options like subtitles to access the
info?
Web resource Tool Score calculation

Total Score: Step 1 + step 2

Discussion
National health agency websites represent an important channel for sharing
information to help decrease the spread of COVID-19. In this study, The Swiss
Cheese Model best describes the concept of layering protections against COVID-19,
recognizing that one individual form of health protection (such as masking, isolation,
vaccination, etc.) can have imperfections and allow for the continued spread of
COVID-19. The Swiss Cheese Model illustrates how combinations of protections can
collectively decrease the spread of this virus (Figure 1). The precautionary principle
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supports sharing potential harm-reduction information in the face of scientific
uncertainty during a public health crisis. Because no dominant form of COVID-19
transmission has been identified, and gaps in evidence persist, precautionary measures
such as layering protection strategies to decrease the spread of COVID-19 are
reasonable and recommended (Fisher 2016).
Through this study, I found that information about masking, travel/border
control, isolation, social distancing, vaccination, and ventilation is available across
national health agency websites for Taiwan, Kenya, and the U.S. Each website
examined provided information about each mitigation strategy during the period of
January 30 to February 28, 2022. In keeping with U.S. CDC CERC principles, each
website provided credible information and promoted actions aimed to decrease the
spread of COVID-19. This mirrors the use of CERC principles in other contexts
including the use of secure text messaging rather than emails to deliver timely updates
on emerging new data for COVID-19 (Yoon, 2021). Credible data were also made
available for Taiwan, Kenya, and the U.S. through website collaborations with World
Health Organization, which provided published scientific literature on COVID-19
(Umviligihozo, 2020; Falciola, 2022). As evidence continues to emerge about
dominant transmission routes, future studies may investigate the relative effectiveness
of providing information about different combinations of mitigation strategies to
decrease the spread of COVID-19.
Although information about each health protection was available across all
three government websites, some information required more clicks to access (Table
1a). For example, masking and isolation information on the Taiwan CDC site took 15
and 10 clicks, respectively (Table 1a). On the other hand, the U.S. CDC provided
access to information for all mitigation strategies included in this analysis with just

NATIONAL HEALTH AGENCY WEBSITES

21

one click from the primary landing page. The U.S. CDC also provided the most
information about masking through four types of communication products in the form
of video messaging, guideline flyers (PDFs), infographics, and standard website pages
and visual aids (Table 1b). Kenya’s health agency website required more clicks to
gather information on ventilation and travel when compared to the U.S. Vaccination
information was easy to find across all three websites with only one click. Finally,
information on isolation was featured in the fewest types of communication products
across all three websites (Table 1b). Several factors may contribute to these
discrepancies.
Information for masking and isolation in Taiwan was more challenging to find
than vaccination information, potentially for several reasons. Asian countries focused
more early mandatory lockdowns at borders (Mallah 2021), while other countries took
more of a conservative response focused on decreasing social gatherings and
promoting hand hygiene (Wangari et al 2021). Taiwan’s response was built upon
lessons learned after the 2003 SARS and 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreaks (Mallah
2021). Prevalence of masking during outbreaks in Asian countries tends to be higher,
partly as a result of those lessons (Elachola, Ebrahim, & Gozzer, 2020). Thus, lower
levels of masking information on the Taiwan CDC website may reflect assumptions
about greater existing knowledge of the effectiveness of this strategy as it relates to
the SARS response. The response of SARS 2003 involved the public and allowed the
country to introduce measures such as “rapid dissemination, of information, early case
detection and isolation, tracing and quarantining of SARS contacts, traveller
screening, raising public awareness of risk and institution of stricter infection control
in health care settings” (Ahmad 2009). Masking was among the measures “seen
everywhere on the streets in Guangzhou” (Qui, 2018 p. 2). History thus may have
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influenced Taiwan’s response on managing disease outbreaks and the use of specific
health protections like masking. Most of Taiwan CDC’s recent focus on vaccination,
however, may be an attempt to promote knowledge about this emerging COVID-19
protection. The U.S. has also placed a greater focus on vaccination, with the highest
total number of vaccination doses per 100 people as of February 25th (Mallah 2021).
Vaccination has become an important layer of protection to decrease the spread of
COVID -19.
Quality of health protection information was noted to be similar in all areas
except for Usability (Table 2). Appropriate evidence-based information was provided
for all government websites across the three nations of Taiwan, Kenya, and the U.S.,
with the exception of the strength of the recommendations which was not provided in
a GRADE format (Table 2). The transparency of the website information was present
by all three websites as indicated by a “Y” response on the web resource tool (Table
2). The Usability was most similar in Taiwan and Kenya, with the U.S. scoring better
than the two countries because there was a more direct flow by links to specific health
protection information on the U.S. CDC website. Thus, the more direct flow to
information through fewer links led to an assessment of more “logical flow”, which
resulted in a slightly higher U.S. score on the WRR for overall quality.
It is important to recognize several limitations of this research. This is a
descriptive study that does not explore data about website user characteristics or
adoption of mitigation strategies because these data were not publicly available during
the study period. Since this was a cross sectional study and website information is
constantly changing, findings do not reflect how national communication priorities
have evolved outside the study time frame. Cultural variation may reflect what
information is believed to be important or what knowledge is taken for granted as
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known within a given country. Finally, only one coder rated the availability,
navigability, and quality of website information across the websites. Thus, there was
no intercoder reliability.
Although the Taiwan CDC and Kenya Ministry of Health websites scored
slightly lower than the U.S. CDC on the WRR tool, both Taiwan and Kenya have seen
better morbidity and mortality outcomes than the U.S. during the COVID-19
pandemic. It is important to recognize that the provision of national health agency
website information is only one facet in a national pandemic response. Websites are
just one of many channels for disseminating information to decrease transmission of
COVID-19, and there may be important differences between users of national health
agency websites and individuals who do not use such sources of information. For
example, not everyone has access to computers or high-speed internet. Without user
data, it is difficult to determine whether website visitors are representative of the
general population. Further, previous research on governmental and popular health
organization websites has indicated that online COVID-19 materials should be
modified to reach recommended reading levels (Ojo 2020). Other user demographic
factors such as age, health literacy, language spoken, and sociodemographic
background also could play an important part in how information is received and
used. For health messages to be followed effectively, they must be tailored to the
health literacy of the audience, while also reducing panic and anxiety and serving as
an effective source of health guidance (Castro-Sanchez 2016).
Although information about mitigation strategies is available on these national
health agency websites, it is not known to what extent any of the mitigation strategies
have been adopted as a result. Behaviour can be driven by political, social, or cultural
influences. For example, perceived government empowerment can influence
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individual behaviours (Chang 2020). Future research may wish to use prospective
trials to track users who frequent national health agency websites. Baseline data on
user perceptions and sociodemographic characteristics can be captured with initial
surveys, with adoption and other behaviour changes tracked over a set of follow-up
surveys. However, by identifying the availability, navigability, and quality of
mitigation information across three national health agency websites, this study has
taken an important first step toward identifying specific areas of interest and datarelated limitations for future studies that may further examine pandemic
communication channels and content.
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